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The role of government in the venture capital market with asymmetric information

Anson Wong

Quantitative Finance, 2014, vol. 14, issue 6, 1107-1114

Abstract: Information asymmetry increases the risks undertaken by venture capitalists. The present study departs from the tendency in earlier analyses to attribute the problem of information asymmetry to the entrepreneur only. In view of the obvious social benefits that the development of the venture capital industry brings, the government should take upon itself to consider tax incentives and changes to regulatory policies in order to attract venture capital investments. Three scenarios are portrayed here to examine the issue of asymmetric information in the venture capital market: (1) when both the venture capitalist's and entrepreneur's efforts are observable and the government incentive policy is available; (2) when the entrepreneur's effort is unobservable but the venture capitalist's is observable and government tax incentive is available; and (3) when the entrepreneur's effort is observable but the venture capitalist's effort is unobservable, and regulatory monitoring and government tax incentives are uncertain. This investigation reveals that the tax incentive policy and regulatory measures put in place by the government can significantly and positively affect the outcome of the entrepreneurial project by reducing information asymmetry.

Date: 2014
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