The timing of debt renegotiation and its implications for irreversible investment and capital structure

Zhaojun Yang and Nanhui Zhu

Quantitative Finance, 2023, vol. 23, issue 5, 887-900

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of a single round of debt renegotiation on investment and financing decisions. We produce an analytical proof for the widely-used assertion that optimal renegotiation time is common default time. We show that debt renegotiation accelerates investment and increases the investment option value by around 15%. Renegotiation surplus increases with project risk but decreases with sunk cost. Investment option value has an inverted U-shaped link with debtholders' bargaining power. If tax rate is moderate, optimal leverage with renegotiation is greater than that without renegotiation but if it is sufficiently high, the opposite holds true.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1080/14697688.2023.2186260

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