 First voluntary disclosure: is it less opportunistic?Young-Soo Choi Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2015, vol. 22, issue 4, 347-367 Abstract: The objective of voluntary disclosure regulation is to mitigate information asymmetry between the management and outside users. However, prior studies on voluntary disclosures provide mixed evidences on managers' incentives. Using a setting of voluntary non-generally accepted accounting principles earnings per share (GAAP EPS) reporting, this study attempts to examine whether the first non-GAAP EPS reporting is less dominated by opportunistic incentives. Consistent with the predictions of this research, it reveals that the duration to the first adjusted EPS disclosure is not more sensitive to negative transitory items, and moreover investors' perception on the first non-GAAP EPS is more positive compared to subsequent ones. The less opportunistic behaviour on the first disclosure can be well explained by the management's awareness of intensified monitoring by outside stakeholders. Date: 2015 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:raaexx:v:22:y:2015:i:4:p:347-367 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2014.896187 Access Statistics for this article Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics is currently edited by Yin-Wong Cheung, Hong Hwang, Jeong-Bon Kim, Shu-Hsing Li and Suresh Radhakrishnan More articles in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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