EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Eco-technology licensing by a foreign innovator and privatization policy in a polluting mixed duopoly

Seung-Leul Kim, Sang-Ho Lee and Toshihiro Matsumura

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2018, vol. 25, issue 3-4, 433-448

Abstract: This article investigates the fixed-fee licensing contract in a mixed duopoly where public and private firms may purchase eco-technology from a foreign innovator. We show that the foreign innovator chooses either an exclusive or a non-exclusive licensing contract, depending on (i) the cost gap between the two firms, (ii) the environmental damage caused by pollutants, and (iii) whether a public firm is privatized or not. We further examine the welfare consequences of non-exclusive licensing, exclusive licensing and discriminatory fixed-fee licensing contracts, respectively, and show that privatization improves social welfare when both cost gap and environmental damage are large.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/16081625.2017.1339617 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:raaexx:v:25:y:2018:i:3-4:p:433-448

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/raae20

DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2017.1339617

Access Statistics for this article

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics is currently edited by Yin-Wong Cheung, Hong Hwang, Jeong-Bon Kim, Shu-Hsing Li and Suresh Radhakrishnan

More articles in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:taf:raaexx:v:25:y:2018:i:3-4:p:433-448