Price pressure effects of short selling on environmental disclosure
Sheng Yao
Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2022, vol. 29, issue 4, 916-938
Abstract:
Most studies argue that short selling is an external constraint mechanism that can restrict managers’ manipulation of financial information according to the disciplining hypothesis. Whether this conclusion is also suitable for environmental information, however, is still unclear. Therefore, we examine the effect of short selling on environmental disclosure by using empirical data from China. We find that pilot firms, after being added to the pilot short-selling list, disclose less environmental information than non-pilot firms do. Further examination shows that the pilot firms’ internal and external monitoring mechanisms can affect managers’ decision-making regarding environmental information. The results suggest that when a short-selling mechanism is implemented, it is important that the appropriate regulatory department mandatorily receives environmental information disclosure. Simultaneously, the pilot firms’ internal and external monitoring mechanisms should be strengthened to mitigate the negative disclosure behavior of managers.
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:raaexx:v:29:y:2022:i:4:p:916-938
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DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2020.1754250
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Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics is currently edited by Yin-Wong Cheung, Hong Hwang, Jeong-Bon Kim, Shu-Hsing Li and Suresh Radhakrishnan
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