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Corporate social responsibility: opportunistic behavior under earnings management?

Jianhui Jian, Keke He, Yuan Liu and Yulong Sun

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2024, vol. 31, issue 2, 247-268

Abstract: This paper investigates whether companies actively use social responsibility to divert public attention from the quality of their accounting information when implementing earnings management. The results show a significant positive relationship between EM and CSR. The mechanism of influence suggests that the risk of share price collapse, investor sentiment and the cost of capital play a mediating role. Subgroup tests reveal that this corporate masking and rent-seeking motive is more pronounced in underperforming, non-family-owned and non-state owned firms. Further research finds that corporate governance mechanisms such as equity incentives, fund ownership, and high concentration of equity can moderate this opportunism.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2023.2170891

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Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics is currently edited by Yin-Wong Cheung, Hong Hwang, Jeong-Bon Kim, Shu-Hsing Li and Suresh Radhakrishnan

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