Bankruptcy and the Nash solution

Jacques A. Schnabel

Applied Financial Economics Letters, 2007, vol. 3, issue 4, 251-254

Abstract: The putative deficiency of the Nash solution to the bankruptcy game discussed in textbooks is shown to be a mere artefact of an unrealistic assumption made regarding the alternatives available to the bankrupt firm's creditors.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/17446540601018972

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