EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Does the attendance of independent directors at shareholder meetings matter? The case of risk taking

Shuai Qin, Jinsong Tan and Xiangting Kong

China Journal of Accounting Studies, 2023, vol. 11, issue 4, 826-863

Abstract: Information is the basis for independent directors to make correct decisions. The study found that the participation of independent directors in the shareholder meetings would help them to obtain more real information and curb the excessive risk taking phenomenon of firms caused by agency problems. The mechanism is that independent directors make more stable decisions after obtaining more real information, have higher probability and frequency of dissenting opinions, and reduce the risk tolerance of the board. The diligent behavior of the independent directors who actively participated in the shareholder meetings has been rewarded by the labor market, and they will get more allowances and directorships in the future. The research of this paper has reference significance for the regulators to broaden the access to information of independent directors and improve the performance of independent directors.

Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/21697213.2023.2239677 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rcjaxx:v:11:y:2023:i:4:p:826-863

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rcja20

DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2023.2239677

Access Statistics for this article

China Journal of Accounting Studies is currently edited by Xiaochen Dou

More articles in China Journal of Accounting Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:rcjaxx:v:11:y:2023:i:4:p:826-863