Does the geographical proximity between the chairman and the CEO affect internal control quality?
Junli Yu,
Xin Jin and
Shangkun Liang
China Journal of Accounting Studies, 2017, vol. 5, issue 3, 344-360
Abstract:
This article redefines the concept of proximity governance and explains the determinants of internal control quality from the perspective of an informal institutional arrangement. Based on an internal network (chairman–chief executive officer geographical proximity), we examine the effects of proximity governance on internal control quality using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2013. We conclude that the geographical proximity has a negative impact on internal control quality and this effect is weaker in state-owned enterprises than in private enterprises. Further empirical evidence shows that the negative effect of the geographical proximity on internal control quality can be moderated if the company has an interlocking business network. This study enriches the research literature on internal governance in emerging markets and provides reference for management selection strategies and standards of internal control.
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/21697213.2017.1375638 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rcjaxx:v:5:y:2017:i:3:p:344-360
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rcja20
DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2017.1375638
Access Statistics for this article
China Journal of Accounting Studies is currently edited by Xiaochen Dou
More articles in China Journal of Accounting Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().