Large shareholders’ tunneling and stock price crash risk

Shangkun Liang, Yanfeng Jiang, Junli Yu and Wei Xu

China Journal of Accounting Studies, 2021, vol. 9, issue 4, 469-489

Abstract: Tunnelling by large shareholders is a problem representative of ownership concentration. Large shareholders may interfere with a firm’s information disclosure to support their tunnelling behaviour, causing a high stock price crash risk. Using listed companies in China from 2001 to 2019 as a sample, we find that more severe tunnelling can lead to a higher risk of stock price crashes. Moreover, we investigate potential factors such as internal control, operational performance, and split-share reforms, that may affect the aforementioned relationship. A high level of internal control and good operational performance will weaken the relationship, and the relationship is stronger before split-share reforms. The findings of this study contribute to a better understanding of the relationship given China’s institutional background and better investor protection.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/21697213.2022.2082717 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rcjaxx:v:9:y:2021:i:4:p:469-489

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rcja20

DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2022.2082717

Access Statistics for this article

China Journal of Accounting Studies is currently edited by Xiaochen Dou

More articles in China Journal of Accounting Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().