 Preventing collusive tendering in public markets – the case of framework agreementsPenelope-Alexia Giosa European Competition Journal, 2020, vol. 16, issue 2-3, 281-311 Abstract: Anti-competitive activities, like bid-rigging, undermine the main objectives of public procurement, such as value for money and efficiency in the procurement process. The magnitude of the problem in Europe is demonstrated by the frequency of bid-rigging cases. As it has already been underlined in the literature, bid-rigging may arise particularly in the context of framework agreements, which are constantly gaining ground in public procurement and are rather popular in Nothern Europe. In light of the framework agreements’ popularity in Europe and their vulnerability to collusion, this article identifies the elements of a framework agreement that make coordination feasible and bid-rigging attractive to the suppliers admitted to the framework agreement. This article also makes a number of suggestions for preventing the problem of collusion in framework agreements, with the aim of introducing new design features that will significantly reduce the scope for collusive outcomes within the procurement function. Date: 2020 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:recjxx:v:16:y:2020:i:2-3:p:281-311 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2020.1732681 Access Statistics for this article European Competition Journal is currently edited by Philip Marsden More articles in European Competition Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.