Assessing abuse of dominance in the platform economy: a case study of app stores

Friso Bostoen and Daniel Mândrescu

European Competition Journal, 2020, vol. 16, issue 2-3, 431-491

Abstract: App stores constitute a quintessential multisided platform market, where a few players (Apple and Google) facilitate transactions between third-party suppliers (app developers) and consumers in exchange for a commission fee. Complicating matters, these app stores are embedded in intricate mobile ecosystems with varying degrees of “openness” to third parties. Increasingly, these third parties are complaining about allegedly anticompetitive practices. In particular, the operators of app stores are said to preference the distribution of their own apps over those of competitors, levy excessive commission fees, and operate in a non-transparent manner. We offer a comprehensive assessment under Article 102 TFEU, examining market definition and market power of app stores, the application of various theories of harm (and corresponding legal tests) to their allegedly anticompetitive behaviour, potential justifications for said behaviour, as well as the impact of the new P2B Regulation and on-going regulatory initiatives.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2020.1805698

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