FRAND to address competition issues posed by major digital platforms?

Minh Hung Tao

European Competition Journal, 2020, vol. 16, issue 2-3, 595-612

Abstract: Major digital platforms (MDPs) such as App Store, Amazon e-commerce site, Google search engine, or Facebook have increasingly shown their significance in our daily lives. The convenience they bring, nonetheless, may distract us from noticing how they are capable of executing their powers to influence different markets or even politics on a global scale. While competition (antitrust) law struggles to deal with the advanced, cutting-edge nature of MDPs, some scholars and antitrust authorities have conceived of applying FRAND (or a quasi-FRAND model), which has proved considerably successful in the field of telecommunication standardization, as a regulatory measure to control unprecedented powers of MDPs. Having said that, to that end, certain complicated policy and technical issues must be analyzed and addressed thoroughly.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2020.1834993

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