What if error risk could embrace uncertainty?

Erwann Kerguelen

European Competition Journal, 2021, vol. 17, issue 1, 188-204

Abstract: Aiming at lowering false positive errors (type I error), antitrust enforcement in the digital sector may have neglected false negative errors (type II error), notably due to the assessment of uncertainty, as a probability of occurrence of harm and as a consequence of the incredible dynamics of these markets.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2020.1863038

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