The game behind the game: UEFA's Financial Fair Play Regulations and the need to field a substitute
Jesse Kalashyan
European Competition Journal, 2022, vol. 18, issue 1, 21-81
Abstract:
European soccer clubs tend to spend beyond their revenues, causing disruptions in their finances. To minimize these disruptions, UEFA enacted the Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP). FFP achieves its objectives through the “break-even” requirement, which prohibits clubs from spending beyond their revenues. This article argues that FFP violates Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. While there has been scholarly interest in FFP’s incompatibility with competition law, the focus has been on Article 101. In addition to contributing to the scholarship on FFP’s violation of Article 101, this article presents arguments on how FFP violates Article 102. This article then explores UEFA’s interactions with European regulators as a backdrop for explaining why regulators have failed to address FFP’s violation of Articles 101 and 102. This article concludes by arguing that a change to FFP is imminent and suggests a novel method through which UEFA can maintain FFP’s objectives while complying with competition law.
Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/17441056.2021.1935570 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:recjxx:v:18:y:2022:i:1:p:21-81
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/recj20
DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1935570
Access Statistics for this article
European Competition Journal is currently edited by Philip Marsden
More articles in European Competition Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().