Strengthening effective antitrust enforcement in digital platform markets

Damien Geradin and Dimitrios Katsifis

European Competition Journal, 2022, vol. 18, issue 2, 356-405

Abstract: While the initiatives in various jurisdictions to impose ex ante regulation on “digital gatekeepers” – large online platforms that are necessary intermediaries between business users and their customers – have attracted considerable attention, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the equally important need to strengthen effective antitrust enforcement in digital markets. The focus is on possible adjustments to the current competition law framework on unilateral conduct. The paper examines four proposals. First, it argues in favour of revisiting the error-cost framework and considering the introduction of presumptions of anticompetitiveness in limited circumstances. Second, it makes the case that competition authorities should make greater use of restorative remedies to reinject lost competition in the market. Third, it discusses the need for greater focus on harms to quality and innovation. Fourth, it argues that when competition has been irreparably harmed, EU competition authorities should consider exploitative cases.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.2002589

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