The case against green antitrust

Cento Veljanovski

European Competition Journal, 2022, vol. 18, issue 3, 501-513

Abstract: The case for a greener antitrust is weak and flawed. It is largely abstract, hypothetical, legalistic, somewhat emotive and lacks supporting evidence. Its proponents claim that the European Commission’s enforcement of Article 101 TFEU blocks efficient industry-initiated cooperation to improve sustainability. But as is shown, this more permissive approach will lead to increased market power, supra-competitive prices and greater industry profits, and is unlikely to achieve greater investment in and the faster adoption of green technologies than competition.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2056346

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