Tackling gatekeepers’ self-preferencing practices

Christophe Samuel Hutchinson and Diana Treščáková

European Competition Journal, 2022, vol. 18, issue 3, 567-590

Abstract: “Self-preferencing” refers to a conduct of a large provider of core platform services which consists in favouring one’s own products and services over those offered by competitors on the same platform. Drawing on the experience acquired through its various antitrust investigations into the conducts of Big Tech, the European Commission, in its its “proposal for the Digital Market Act”, has put forward the concept of “gatekeeper”. If adopted, this regulatory instrument which aims at ensuring fairness and transparency in the EU digital markets, would enable the Commission to qualify as such any large core platform service on the basis of narrowly defined objectives criteria and submit it to a set of prohibitions and obligations. By opting for such an approach, the Commission would be able to switch from an ex-post assessment of a gatekeepers’ self-preferencing practices to an ex-ante one.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2034332

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