Exclusionary innovation in the European Commission’s decisions against Google

Baskaran Balasingham

European Competition Journal, 2022, vol. 18, issue 3, 631-657

Abstract: Exclusionary innovation poses a bigger threat to competition in digital platform markets than in other innovation markets given the relevance of data-driven network effects as well as the strong incentive and ability of digital platforms to pursue an envelopment strategy. This paper advocates a theory of harm called “platform-wide exclusionary innovation” which applies to conduct that plausibly creates short-term consumer benefit but is more likely to foreclose rivals and therefore reduce technological progress in the long run. This theory of harm can help to explain Google’s conduct that the European Commission condemned in its three decisions against Google between 2017 and 2019. Due to interconnections between Google’s practices in the three cases this article assesses whether they may be considered jointly for the purpose of finding of an infringement of Article 102 TFEU or under the proposed Digital Markets Act.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/17441056.2022.2115871 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:recjxx:v:18:y:2022:i:3:p:631-657

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/recj20

DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2115871

Access Statistics for this article

European Competition Journal is currently edited by Philip Marsden

More articles in European Competition Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().