Article 102 TFEU to the rescue: filling the legal gaps of the airport slot regulation

Tuvana Aras

European Competition Journal, 2022, vol. 18, issue 3, 658-682

Abstract: The present article analyses the competition issues that arise from the legal gaps of the Slot Regulation (95/93/EC). Although the Slot Regulation targets a just allocation system, allowing market access for all airlines, the augmenting number of congested airports in the European Union makes it hard to attribute slots to newcomers. The gaps of the Slot Regulation have led to problematic conducts such as 'slot hoarding' as incumbent carriers are aware of the financial and operational importance of these slots, and of their scarcity. The gaps have also allowed dominant airlines to engage in secondary slot trading under secretive and potentially anti-competitive terms, which may have an impact on the competitiveness of the market. The article examines the applicability of Article 102 TFEU to airlines that may abuse their dominance created by the number of slots they have under the essential facilities doctrine and the margin squeeze theory.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2128551

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