Digital merger control: adapting theories of harm

Viktoria H. S. E. Robertson

European Competition Journal, 2024, vol. 20, issue 2, 437-459

Abstract: The rising concentration in digital platform markets raises the question to what extent traditional merger control is effective in these market environments. This contribution sheds a light on ways in which national competition authorities throughout the European Union and in the United Kingdom have adapted their analyses to the specific characteristics and complexities of digital markets. Through detailed case studies, I offer insights into ways in which horizontal, vertical and conglomerate theories of harm were made relevant to digital markets. At the same time, the case analysis shows areas in which competition law should further develop theories of harm in line with the insights into these market environments, particularly as regards ecosystem theories of harm.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2024.2307163

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