The value of screening tools in cartel cases

Malin Arve, Armando Garcia Pires, Ronny Gjendemsjø, Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui and Frode Skjeret

European Competition Journal, 2025, vol. 21, issue 1, 211-230

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the value of screening tests for competition authorities in cartel cases to raise red flags about possible cartels and as a deterrence on new or existing cartels. We start by looking at one of the main problems of screen tests: false positives. We show that multiple screen tests can function as a useful tool to reduce false positives. We then study the legal foundations of screen tests considering the EU competition law and build a case to use screen tests to trigger dawn raids.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2024.2428029

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