The Google dilemma: as hyper-profits generation continues apace, the EU Commission’s enforcement approach fails to deter Google from engaging in exclusionary multi-market anti-competitive activities

Dermot Cahill and Jing Wang

European Competition Journal, 2025, vol. 21, issue 2, 421-435

Abstract: Recently designated as an EU Digital Markets Act “gatekeeper”, this article examines Google’s history of engaging in exclusionary anti-competitive practices in Europe, leveraging its dominance from one online market to another, adversely affecting consumers and competition along the way, and raises the question whether current fining levels are a sufficient deterrent to large online platforms who generate hundreds of billions of dollars every year.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2024.2440223

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