Optimal Opt-in “Climate” Contracts

Juan-Pablo Montero

Journal of Applied Economics, 1998, vol. 1, issue 2, 363-384

Abstract: The paper studies the design of a tradeable permit system with voluntarily opt-in possibilities for LDCs in the context of climate change. In setting the optimal opt-in rule, the social planner faces a trade-off between production efficiency (minimization of control costs) and information rent extraction (reduction of excess permits). Results from a simulation exercise based on data from MIT's EPPA model are also provided.

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1080/15140326.1998.12040527

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