Fiscal Decentralization and Voters' Choices as Control

Alberto Porto and Natalia Porto

Journal of Applied Economics, 2000, vol. 3, issue 1, 135-167

Abstract: This paper investigates, empirically, the voters' choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization.

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1080/15140326.2000.12040548

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