Ownership Concentration, Market Monitoring and Performance: Evidence from the UK, The Czech Republic and Poland

Vahe Lskavyan and Mariana Spatareanu

Journal of Applied Economics, 2006, vol. 9, issue 1, 91-104

Abstract: Using data for publicly traded companies from the UK and two transition countries, the Czech Republic and Poland, we analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and performance while also accounting for the effect of hostile takeover threats on this relationship. Some argue that ownership concentration will improve performance by making the owners more willing or able to monitor managers. Others argue that in the presence of efficient markets, market monitoring (via the threat of hostile takeovers) will discipline the managers. Our results show that concentration is insignificant in explaining performance both in the transition countries, where market monitoring is supposedly weak, and in the UK, where market monitoring is supposedly strong.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1080/15140326.2006.12040639

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