Organized crime, suspicious transaction reporting and anti-money laundering regulation

Lucia dalla Pellegrina, Giorgio Di Maio, Donato Masciandaro () and Margherita Saraceno

Regional Studies, 2020, vol. 54, issue 12, 1761-1775

Abstract: This study investigates the efficiency of suspicious transaction reporting activity to a financial intelligence unit as a means to deter money laundering. Baseline and two-province theoretical models are used to frame the empirical analysis. The latter examines the relationship between suspicious transaction reporting and the vulnerability of Italian provinces to money laundering from 2009 to 2013. Instrumental variables and spatial analysis are exploited to identify the role of suspicious transaction reporting on vulnerability. The results provide a positive assessment of the risk-based mechanism of reporting suspicious operations to the financial intelligence unit, although ‘congestion’ problems from overreporting are observed.

Date: 2020
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Related works:
Working Paper: Detecting the Fifty Shades of Grey: Local Crime, Suspicious Transaction Reporting and Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (2018)
Working Paper: Vulnerability to Money Laundering and Crime Deterrence: Evidence from Italy (2017)
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DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2020.1772963

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