Interest Alignment and Insider Shareholdings in the Emerging Asian REIT Markets

Syahzan Sani Kudus and Tien Foo Sing

Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 2011, vol. 17, issue 2, 127-138

Abstract: Executive Summary. The Asian real estate investment trust (REIT) markets have recently experienced an explosive growth. However, studies on their corporate governance have been limited. This paper aims to fill the gap by testing the effects of board independence and shareownership structure on the performance of sample Asian REITs. Using dynamic panel regressions with instrumental variables on sample REITs in five Asian markets, the relationship between insider shareholdings and board independence is found to be non-linear. Insiders with large shareholding interests do not entrench their controls by selecting fewer and friendly independent directors onto the boards. Consistent with the hypothesis of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), large shareholdings by insiders (sponsors) are viewed as a signal of interest alignment with small shareholders. Asian REITs with large controlling insiders outperform other REITs that are not backed by strong insiders' shareholdings.

Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10835547.2011.12089894 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:repmxx:v:17:y:2011:i:2:p:127-138

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/repm20

DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2011.12089894

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management is currently edited by Peng Liu and Vivek Sah

More articles in Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().