Upstream SOEs in the mixed-ownership reform

Qian Liu and Leonard F. S. Wang

Economic and Political Studies, 2022, vol. 10, issue 4, 462-475

Abstract: This article explores possible options of the upstream mixed-ownership reform with imperfect substitute products in a vertically related market composed of one upstream SOE and two downstream profit-maximising retailers. Its focus is not only on incorporating the issue of privatisation into a vertical market structure, but also on extending the traditional upstream–downstream competition model by allowing the active contribution of retailers to enhance values at different costs. It finds that in a vertically related market where retailers’ effort matters, the socially optimal policy towards the upstream SOE is partial privatisation regardless what product differentiation is involved, but the specific degree of privatisation is negatively correlated to the level of effort costs. By contrast, in a vertically related market without retailers’ effort, the government tends to choose full nationalisation of the firm.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2022.2052453

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