Does rationality matter to the central bank?
H. E. Cha
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 2021, vol. 34, issue 1, 3183-3200
Abstract:
Rationality is one of the main assumptions in economics, and is represented as the rational expectation in macroeconomics. As such, it is important to note that the effectiveness of economic policy depends on the degree of economic agents’ rationality. According to this point of view, it is only natural to ask how the central bank views economic agents to be either rational or bounded rational. In implementing economic policies, it is possible to assume that the central bank views economic agents to be bounded rational. This is due to the fact that most theoretical arguments state that policy under rationality is not as effective as one under bounded rationality. Based on this argument, this paper employs bounded rational New Keynesian Model proposed by Gabaix to know if rationality matters to the central bank. As a result, as long as the central bank does not follow the full gradualism, it is possible to conclude that the rationality matters to the central bank. However, it is not anymore if the central bank employs full gradualism in monetary policy rule.
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2020.1869577
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