Egypt: The Anatomy of Succession

Joshua Stacher

Review of African Political Economy, 2008, vol. 35, issue 116, 301-314

Abstract: This article examines how the procedural aspects of Egypt's first presidential elections permitted the ruling regime to persist without a serious challenge. By taking stock of how the procedural rules of the game were manipulated to favour the incumbent, and the creation of an administrative body with extrajudicial powers guaranteeing the known result, this article will argue that the character of Constitutional Amendment 76 sET a precedent that will likely favour the succession in 2011 of Hosni Mubarak's son, Gamal.

Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1080/03056240802196807

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Review of African Political Economy is currently edited by Graham Harrison, Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Claire Mercer, Nicolas Pons-Vignon, Aurelia Segatti and Ray Bush

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