Rethinking the ‘patron–client’ politics of oil block allocation, development and remittances in Nigeria
Victor Chidubem Iwuoha
Review of African Political Economy, 2021, vol. 48, issue 170, 552-580
Abstract:
This research adopts qualitative method and patron–client analysis to underscore the political economy of oil block allocation, development and receipts/remittances in Nigeria. It contests Wilson’s (1961) and Scott’s (1972) claims on the superiority of the patron over clients, and argues that ‘clients’ in Nigeria (indigenous oil block awardees) maintain some degree of control over the patron (ruling elite), enjoy more economic returns/oil rents, and possess some leverage over the patrons’ decision-making power. The ruling elite’s personalisation of oil block allocation/rents results in poor development of the upstream oil sector by ‘clients’, defaults in oil remittances and a consistent decline in oil production. The author recommends that the bidding process for oil block allocation be carried out in a more transparent and competitive manner.
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:revape:v:48:y:2021:i:170:p:552-580
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DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2021.1998768
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Review of African Political Economy is currently edited by Graham Harrison, Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Claire Mercer, Nicolas Pons-Vignon, Aurelia Segatti and Ray Bush
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