EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

‘The assisting hand’ or ‘the grabbing hand’: experimental evidence from PPP investments in the implementation of official rotation systems

Yefeng Chen, Xiaoqin Liu and Ying Liu

Journal of Chinese Governance, 2025, vol. 10, issue 2, 218-253

Abstract: In the context of uneven and insufficient social development, examining the relationship between the official rotation system and the quality of government services offers an effective guide to addressing government misconduct and reducing wealth disparities. This study employs a public goods game experiment to simulate the investment scenario of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, focusing on three pivotal questions: Firstly, do the ‘assisting hand’ and the ‘grabbing hand’ of officials differ between developed and underdeveloped regions? Secondly, can the interregional rotation system enhance the ‘assisting hand’ and weaken the ‘grabbing hand’ in both areas? Lastly, can political tournaments more effectively alleviate the issue of ‘government misconduct’? The experimental results reveal: Firstly, low economic growth potential limits the ‘assisting hand’ of officials while fostering the ‘grabbing hand’; secondly, the interregional rotation system strengthens the ‘assisting hand’ in underdeveloped areas but weakens it in developed regions; finally, compared to the interregional rotation system, the tournament system reinforces the ‘assisting hand’ in developed regions. These findings provide micro-level insights into the relationship between official behavior and regional characteristics, and offer significant implications for the reform of governance policies.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/23812346.2024.2408499 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rgovxx:v:10:y:2025:i:2:p:218-253

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rgov20

DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2024.2408499

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Chinese Governance is currently edited by Sujian Guo

More articles in Journal of Chinese Governance from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-06-03
Handle: RePEc:taf:rgovxx:v:10:y:2025:i:2:p:218-253