Political incentives and local connections: the impact of mayor characteristics on the provision of public goods

Yu Teng and Chuanhao Tian

Journal of Chinese Governance, 2025, vol. 10, issue 3, 367-393

Abstract: Different public goods have varying impacts on regional economic and social development. The leaders of prefecture-level cities have distinct investment preferences based on varied goals, and the characteristics of mayors significantly affect expenditure on different types of public goods. Using panel data from prefecture-level cities from 2003 to 2013, this study examines how mayoral characteristics influence public expenditure patterns. The findings suggest that mayors with strong political incentives are more inclined to invest in economic public goods, while their local connections do not exhibit a stable or significant impact on public expenditures. We argue that China’s cadre management system, particularly the regulations on hometown avoidance and the rotation system, prevents mayors from developing stable encompassing interests in their jurisdictions. As a result, even mayors with strong local connections have weak incentives to increase the supply of non-economic public goods. These systems, originally designed to prevent local leaders from building overly powerful local factions that could threaten central governance, also make leaders exhibit the characteristics of ‘roving bandits’, with their behavior heavily influenced by political incentives. This study offers a new perspective on how local leaders’ characteristics influence expenditure decisions under China’s cadre management system and anti-localism policies.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2025.2489596

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