Is China’s regulatory system on urban household waste collection effective? An evidence-based analysis on the evolution of formal rules and contravening informal practices

Benjamin Steuer

Journal of Chinese Governance, 2017, vol. 2, issue 4, 411-436

Abstract: This article addresses the aspect of municipal solid waste management with a particular focus on household waste collection. Within this subject matter lies a peculiar governance challenge that manifests as a contesting, reciprocal dynamic between formal and informal collection systems: the two sides compete for economically valuable waste recyclables and discarded electronics, which prompt both domains to develop respective institutional structures aiming to dominate collection. For the purpose of answering the research question on formal rule effectiveness, the paper employs a theoretical framework based on the Old Institutional Economics. The thereof devised model is used to analyse (a) the historic shift form formal to informal waste collection dominance, (b) formal institutional responses in legislation, (c) the adaptive flexibility of the informal system and (d) the sequential interaction between the two systems. In conclusion, the analysis shows that the formal regulatory system may be interpreted as either ineffective or effective depending on the choice of perspective: formal institutions alone would not suffice to effectively collect waste recyclables and WEEE from households. Simultaneously, however, the formal system has provided a broad institutional leeway that enables informal collection to effectively solve this problem for the benefit of the urban Chinese WM system.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2017.1379166

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