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Politics, law, and administrative discretion: the case of work safety regulation in China

Jie Gao

Journal of Chinese Governance, 2019, vol. 4, issue 1, 71-90

Abstract: Achieving a proper balance between administrative discretion, which promotes efficient and effective governance, and oversight of that discretion to ensure political responsiveness has been a classic and enduring issue in public-administration literature. This study joins the dialogue by examining the question in the context of China, where power is highly concentrated and there are not many checks and balances. By examining administrative discretion in work safety regulation, this study argues that in China’s context, the tension between efficiency and responsiveness is less explicit among the legislature, executive and judiciary powers, but more explicit between central and local powers. In other words, if local bureaucracies have considerable discretionary power, they may use this power to achieve local interests at the expense of national goals. To improve local bureaucracies’ political responsiveness, the Chinese leaders have adopted both legal and managerial measures. On the one hand, administrative discretion has been increasingly curbed through elaborate legislation. On the other hand, management reforms play a crucial role in bringing local leaders’ goals in line with national ones. China’s efforts to balance administrative efficiency and political responsiveness suggest that each country must choose solutions in keeping with its own context and problems.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2018.1522025

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