‘Know Who’ may be better than ‘Know How’: political connections and reactions in administrative disputes in China

Meng U. Ieong

Journal of Chinese Governance, 2019, vol. 4, issue 3, 233-251

Abstract: How do disputants in China solve conflicts involving state actors in their daily life? We analyze the above questions using a representative national dataset and argue that it depends on either ‘Know Who’ or ‘Know How’. We further categorized three potential strategies in solving administrative dispute: Rule-bending, Rule-bound, and Rule-breaking. We find that while elites tend to approach the legal and bureaucratic system, encouraged by political connections, non-elites have to appeal outside the official justice system through petition. The findings herein suggest that China is pursuing regime stability through elite co-optation, which is in line with the theory of political survival.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2019.1570629

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