Political Development and Growth: Japan until World War II

Richard Grabowski

Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 2007, vol. 12, issue 4, 522-547

Abstract: It is hypothesized in this paper that the way by which a ruling elite extracts its resources significantly influences the evolution of state-related institutions. Specifically, if the ruling elite must construct a penetrating set of institutions to extract revenue and in order to encourage payment of taxes must also provide services in return (reciprocity), then states are likely to have institutions conducive to economic growth. Institutions restraining arbitrary decision making are likely to evolve and are likely to be effective. The process of economic and political development in Japan in the prewar period is used to illustrate this process. Specifically, the evolution of limited parliamentary democracy during this time period was the result of the process by which the ruling elite sought to extract revenue.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/13547860701594186

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