Partial privatization, corporate governance, and the role of state-owned holding companies

Choon-Yin Sam

Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 2008, vol. 13, issue 1, 63-88

Abstract: The success of privatized firms has been of interest to researchers in economics. In this study, we examine the role of a state-owned holding company (SOH), serving as a monitoring arm of the government to track the performance of the government-linked companies (GLCs). In the case where state assets are partially privatized, the holding company serves as a useful institution to mitigate the agency problem involving the government as the principal and the GLCs as agents. To play this role effectively, the holding company itself must be respected and well governed. In the first part of this paper, a simple framework is presented to put in context the specific role of the SOH and its relationship with the various stakeholders. Next, we turn to a case study, the Temasek Holdings Limited of Singapore, to gain a better understanding of the style of corporate governance of a holding company.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13547860701731895 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rjapxx:v:13:y:2008:i:1:p:63-88

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rjap20

DOI: 10.1080/13547860701731895

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy is currently edited by Leong Liew

More articles in Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().