A Theoretical and Simulation-based Examination of Single versus Dual Agent Models in China's Housing Market

Yang Zhang, Hong Zhang and Michael Seiler ()

Journal of Real Estate Literature, 2015, vol. 23, issue 2, 335-351

Abstract: We present and contrast a one-agent versus a two-agent theoretical model for residential real estate brokerage consideration in China's housing market. We also present a series of simulations that employ values present in the Chinese marketplace to identify which system should prevail in terms of degree of commission incentive, agent's search effort, and buyer's utility. We find that in the one-agent model, the search effort of the agent is greater, the buyer's commission incentive is lesser, and the buyer's utility is greater. Therefore, a rational buyer will choose to entrust a buying and selling agent instead of only using a buyer's agent.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2015.12090410

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