Property Assessments and Information Asymmetry in Residential Real Estate

Fathali Firoozi, Daniel Hollas, Ronald Rutherford and Thomas Thomson

Journal of Real Estate Research, 2006, vol. 28, issue 3, 275-292

Abstract: This paper presents a game theoretic model of property tax assessment that allows a tax appraiser to either choose a high or a low assessment. The owner either accepts or challenges this assessment. A “fixed effects” regression model is used to evaluate the differences in the assessed values of a sample of houses from Bexar County, Texas during 2000 and 2001. Where the owner of the house is identified as a state licensed property tax consultant, the assessed value, after adjusting for size, age, and other economic characteristics, ranged from a statistically robust 2.5% to 6.2% lower than neighboring houses.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rjerxx:v:28:y:2006:i:3:p:275-292

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DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2006.12091181

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