What Influences the Changes in REIT CEO Compensation? Evidence from Panel Data

John Griffith, Mohammad Najand and H. Shelton Weeks

Journal of Real Estate Research, 2011, vol. 33, issue 2, 209-232

Abstract: This study examines what influences the changes in REIT CEO compensation using the following performance measures: average three-year total returns to shareholders, market value added, Tobin's q, and change in funds from operations. The impact of managerial power on the change in compensation is also examined. The empirical evidence indicates that firm performance and size do not influence the change in CEO salary, while risk, tenure, title, ownership, and age have significant impacts. Bonuses are not influenced by risk, size, or CEO power; however, they are influenced by performance. Option awards are affected by performance and CEO power.

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rjerxx:v:33:y:2011:i:2:p:209-232

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DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2011.12091304

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