Dual Agency Representation: Incentive Conflicts or Efficiencies?

Raymond Brastow and Bennie Waller

Journal of Real Estate Research, 2013, vol. 35, issue 2, 199-222

Abstract: This study is the first to examine dual agency sales over the listing contract between seller and listing agent. We test hypotheses about the timing of dual agency and its effects on sales price and time on market. Probit results indicate that dual agency sales are more likely to occur near the beginning or the end of a listing contract. Three stage least squares results demonstrate that dual agency affects sales price in both periods and that dual agency sales have shorter marketing times. Results support the conclusion that dual agency sales result from both incentives and informational efficiencies.

Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rjerxx:v:35:y:2013:i:2:p:199-222

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DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2013.12091358

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