Do as I Say, Not as I Do: The Role of Advice versus Actions in the Decision to Strategically Default
Michael Seiler ()
Journal of Real Estate Research, 2015, vol. 37, issue 2, 191-216
Abstract:
In this study, I examine relative private signal strength and find that offered advice is significantly more influential in changing strategic mortgage default proclivity than is observed actions. Moreover, these private signals are more reflective of financial herding than they are of an information cascade. From a policy perspective, herds are easier to reverse than are cascades making more effective policies aimed at curbing the incidence of strategic mortgage default. Interestingly, an informationally equivalent change in private signal strength across actions and advice alters strategic default willingness, but not the moral stance of borrowers, which demonstrates the complexity of this life-altering financially and emotionally impactful decision.
Date: 2015
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Journal Article: Do as I Say, Not as I do: The Role of Advice versus Actions in the Decision to Strategically Default (2015) 
Working Paper: Do as I say, Not as I Do: The Role of Advice versus Actions in the Decision to Strategically Default (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rjerxx:v:37:y:2015:i:2:p:191-216
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DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2015.12091412
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