REIT Governance, Entrepreneurial Control, and Corporate Value

Kevin C.H. Chiang, Rocki-Lee DeWitt, David Folkman and Long Jiao

Journal of Real Estate Research, 2018, vol. 40, issue 2, 241-266

Abstract: Real estate investment trusts (REITs) exhibit a wide variety of ownership structures but most are entrepreneurially controlled by founders or families. We investigate the relation between REIT ownership/control and REIT valuation. Using proxy data from 1994 through 2007, our analysis shows that, consistent with the incentive alignment prediction of agency theory, founder/family REITs, on average, have a higher valuation than non-founder/non-family REITs. This result is driven by first-generation family and lone-founder REITs. Our results are also consistent with the entrenchment prediction of agency theory: limits on private benefits of control could lead to higher REIT valuation when founders/families do not occupy both board chairman and CEO positions.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2018.12091499

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