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Agent Performance, Incentives, and Ownership

Peter Chinloy and Daniel Winkler

Journal of Housing Research, 2012, vol. 21, issue 1, 101-121

Abstract: Real estate agents are paid in two ways. One way is from a split percentage of the individual's generated revenue. The other is from an ownership share of the firm's profit from all agents. Tests are performed on whether having ownership increases individual agent performance as measured by the number of transactions, average transaction size, gross sales, and income. For agents in the United States in 2007, ownership raises the volume of transactions among partners and stock holders. Ownership increases gross sales and income by partners but not necessarily among stock holders.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2012.12092053

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