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Modeling political performance of Islamist and Islamist-rooted parties in Turkey

Ali Akarca ()

Middle East Development Journal, 2015, vol. 7, issue 1, 49-69

Abstract: Turkish experience with Islamist and Islamist-rooted parties spanning nearly half a century is studied to understand the factors that caused their transformation and determined their political performance, both while in office and in opposition. A vote equation built, which takes into account all of the key factors mentioned in the economic voting literature, shows that during their rule such parties suffer much less due to strategic voting than other parties but they face a higher cost of ruling. Also, they are affected by the economy in a similar way or even more than other incumbent parties. Moderation in Islamist and Islamist-rooted parties generated through their participation in the parliament and governments, combined with center-right parties deserting their traditional anti-establishment positions, and getting tainted by corruption and incompetence led to massive vote transfers during the last decade from the latter to the former.

Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Modeling Political Performance of Islamist and Islamist-Rooted Parties in Turkey (2013) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1080/17938120.2015.1019295

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