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Interpersonal violence by authoritarian rulers: Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin compared

Matthew Light, Rosemary Gartner and Milomir Strbac

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2014, vol. 30, issue 5, 389-415

Abstract: Why do some authoritarian rulers, such as Saddam Hussein, kill or torture other people personally, whereas others, like Joseph Stalin, delegate such violence to subordinates? Such politically motivated interpersonal violence committed by authoritarian leaders has never before been theorized. Through a comparison of Hussein and Stalin, we explain why some dictators engage in this behavior and others do not. We propose a model based on three components: the individual's prior habituation or non-habituation to violence; regime characteristics that ‘select for’ a personally violent or non-violent ruler; and, once a ruler takes power, the interaction of the first two variables. We also suggest that most communist regimes featured organizational characteristics that discouraged such violence by the leader.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2013.809914

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