Presidential activism and government termination in dual-executive Ukraine

Serhiy Kudelia

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2018, vol. 34, issue 4, 246-261

Abstract: The limits on presidential authority in premier-presidential regimes permit legislatures to wield preeminent influence over government formation and termination. This article shows that even without formal powers to dismiss the prime minister, the president may play a decisive role in government replacement. The article compares three successful and one failed attempt by the president to unseat the prime minister in Ukraine under a premier-presidential system. Based on a review of the significance of 10 variables accounting for presidential activism, it finds that the president’s informal control over institutional veto players as well as the unity of his party faction and cooperation of opposition groups were necessary for the success of attempted cabinet turnover.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2018.1465251

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