Anti-opposition crackdowns and protest: the case of Belarus, 2000–2019

Sasha de Vogel

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2022, vol. 38, issue 1-2, 9-25

Abstract: Anti-opposition crackdowns are a complex form of repression, the effects of which reverberate beyond the political opposition. To understand how these episodes are tied to variation in protest, I develop a theory based on the case of the 2010-2011 crackdown in Belarus. Using a novel protest event dataset covering 2000 to 2019, I show that this crackdown was followed by a sharp decline in protest that particularly affected socio-economic protest. I identify six features of anti-opposition crackdowns and two channels through which they reduce protest. The direct deterrent effect diminishes the political opposition’s capacity to protest. Second, the visibility of the crackdown, coupled with new repressive laws, drives those engaged in less threatening collective action to pre-emptively demobilize; this is the indirect deterrent effect. This article contributes to our understanding of the mechanism that links repression and dissent, while enhancing our knowledge of protest and repression in Belarus.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2037066

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